Communication was one of the central themes that emerged during the Review Team's consultation process and was an issue in every community. Almost all aspects of the response to the 2003 wildfires involved communication in some form or another.

Comments ranged from positive, particularly in relation to the Kelowna wildfires, to critical, especially in the context of the Barriere and McLure wildfires. On the whole, there was a consensus that there is considerable room for improvement in this area.

There were a myriad of federal, provincial, regional and municipal agencies involved in the response to the 2003 interface fires as well as many non-government and volunteer organizations. The sheer size and complexity of the fires, combined with the number of organizations involved, was bound to test the limits of inter-agency communications.

The Review Team heard many examples of interagency communications that were less than ideal. This was particularly noticeable in the early wildfires around Barriere, Chase, Kamloops, and in the southern Okanagan. Next to the wildfires themselves, the most lasting impression many people have of Firestorm 2003 is the information vacuum they found themselves in during the crisis.

It can be concluded without hesitation that at times there was a significant gap in communications among the various agencies involved in the disaster response. This left far too many people affected by the wildfires questioning who was in charge, where could they have obtained timely information, and would it be accurate?

Due to the unique and pervasive role of communications in all aspects of emergency planning, response and recovery it is useful to provide a more detailed description of the comments received by the Review Team and the problems encountered by the citizens themselves.

John Slater, the Mayor of Osoyoos, expressed concerns regarding the lack of communication between such groups as the Office of the Fire Commissioner, the Interior Health Authority and the Ministry of Forests. According to Mayor Slater, information officers in these agencies did not communicate with each other, and at times, each transposed communication into different words and meanings, resulting in incorrect information being released to the media.

The lack of inter-agency communication caused concern among other locally elected officials, who in some instances felt they were out of the information loop at critical periods during the fires. Both Mel Rothenburger, Mayor of Kamloops, and John Ranta, Chair of the Thompson Nicola Regional District (TNRD), voiced concern regarding what they saw as a lack of a clear strategy for elected officials to access available information.

The TNRD presentation stated "Even local politicians who are generally charged with providing up to date information on community issues were often unaware of the status of event or left out of the picture altogether.”

For too many of those affected by the 2003 wildfires, this deficiency in inter-agency communication is best summarized by the comments of a presenter who said, “a lack of timely accurate information contributed to tension, anxiety and fear.”

To be fair, not all commentary around communications was critical. Al Kirkwood, Chief of the Barriere Volunteer Fire Department, noted the tremendous cooperation his community experienced from the British Columbia Forest Protection Branch. Mayor Andy Kormendy of Ashcroft recalled how in his experience the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre worked to ensure that all parties were briefed on activities throughout the area.

The Columbia Shuswap Regional District stated in its submission that communication among groups such as the RCMP, Ministry of Forests, the City of Vernon, PEP, and the Regional District was initially non-existent. However, as the reality of the wildfire disaster emerged, over the next several days communications improved and inter-agency responsibilities, jurisdictions and control were established.

In general it was clear that as the fire season progressed, inter-agency communications improved dramatically and many of the issues were resolved.

That it took time to achieve an improvement in communications can be attributed to a number of things. Many of the individuals involved had no exposure to events of this magnitude and, as a result, they were learning quickly as their experience grew.

The effectiveness of inter-agency communications is also a function of command and control, which is dealt with in the preceding section of this report.

Consultation comments suggest that significant value could come from continuing and intensifying British Columbia's inter-agency training, including participation by emergency teams in large-scale simulations of interface wildfires. Also needed is the development of an overall communications strategy/protocol for major events to define the roles, responsibilities and obligations of those involved.

Communicating with the Public and the Media

Another key aspect of communications focused on how effectively officials provided information to the public and the media. There were divergent viewpoints regarding how local and provincial officials disseminated information to residents affected by the wildfires.

In the early stages of this wildfire season, the flow of information from officials to the public and the media was an issue of great concern. The Review Team received presentations stating that the information provided on specific fires was exaggerated and inaccurate. For example, concerns were expressed about media reports that claimed the town of Barriere had been destroyed.

Similar concerns were expressed about reports of the lodge at Cathedral Lakes being burned, when in fact it had not, and about structural damage in the town of Ashcroft, when none had occurred. Without doubt, hearing reports such as these caused great anguish, grief and confusion among the people of these communities.

On the other hand, in the case of the Kelowna wildfires, local and provincial officials worked diligently to keep the media and the public well informed. The CBC stated in its presentation to the Review Team:

“Officials such as Mayor Walter Gray and Fire Chief Gerry Zimmerman told us everything they knew as soon as they knew it. Officials with the Ministry of Forests provided access to the Kelowna fire to dozens of reporters using a convoy of city buses.” The Review Team also heard that up to six or seven news releases were issued on a daily basis and designated spokespeople were readily available to update the media.

From the perspective of some of the media covering the wildfires, there were also concerns about the flow, timeliness and accuracy of information provided. In its presentation, the CBC pointed to a lack of timely information in the McLure and Barriere wildfires. Some media personnel believed that emergency officials were clamping down on information and not providing reasonable access to the fire zones, forcing reporters and camera crews to get behind fire lines without permission.

The Fire Chief of Barriere shared these reservations about the way communications were handled and stated in his presentation to the Review Team, “the media should have been informed right out, first and foremost.”

The Incident Commander at Barriere confirmed to the Review Team that he ordered the media be kept out of the fire area because he was concerned for their safety. His justification was that the media would get in the way of emergency crews and pose a hazard.

The Review Team was also told that during the early part of the wildfires there was a lack of trained staff able to deal with the media in a professional manner. The Thompson-Nicola Regional District wrote: “media presentations held in Kamloops seemed to be aimed at stemming the media onslaught rather than providing the information truly required by the people impacted by the wildfires.”

This view was echoed by some in the media who described the early response to the communication need as woefully inadequate.

Fundamentally, one can conclude that during the initial interface fires there was a lack of understanding about the role of the media and the assistance they could provide in helping to inform the public. In contrast, and perhaps learning from the initial experiences of those involved in the McLure, Barriere and Kamloops wildfires, the response of provincial and local officials during the later wildfires was focused on ensuring the public and the media received the latest available information in a timely, forthright and accurate manner.

With respect to inter-agency communications, the marked improvement in media communications over the course of the fires suggests there are some lessons to be learned. In particular, the public must receive timely and accurate information right from the beginning of the emergency. To that end, management personnel should focus on delivering information as opposed to managing the message.

As a first step, the provincial government needs to develop a crisis communications strategy that uses all available resources, including the media and the internet, to ensure timely delivery of accurate information to the public.

The province should immediately undertake the development of a provincial communications strategy and protocol for major emergency events defining the roles and responsibilities of those involved. The strategy should:

• Include the participation of all key stakeholders including the media.
• Establish clear principles and protocols about the release of information.
• Identify how the media and the internet can be used in times of emergency as a technical resource and to disseminate information to the public.

The government should catalogue the communications experiences of the summer of 2003 and the improvements that occurred over the course of the fire season so that valuable lessons are not lost.

Information officers in all levels of government should be trained in media relations so they can anticipate and meet crisis-situation needs. Large-scale, unpredictable events that unfold rapidly often create unique information challenges. Specialized training and strategies are required to deal with natural disasters and public emergencies from a communications standpoint.

To coordinate on-site communications during times of emergency, the province should establish a media communications SWAT team with members from municipal, regional, provincial and federal governments and including other major stakeholders as appropriate.

The members of this team would be trained in crisis communications and would serve to facilitate, not stem, the flow of information.

All jurisdictions should consider intensifying inter-agency training efforts, including the use of large-scale interface wildfire simulations, to improve communications.

Good communications within the command and control structure is essential to successful management of an emergency event. The experience of last summer confirmed that the more these skills are used, the stronger they get. Practice is important and all agencies involved should be encouraged to undertake inter-agency communications training on an ongoing basis.

 

Communications Technology

Another key communications issue brought to the attention of the Review Team was the varying state of emergency communications technology across British Columbia. By emergency communications, the Review Team is referring to systems and procedures by which calls for service are received, processed and prioritized and then used as the basis for alerting and dispatching emergency responders to the scene. Communications technology is used to receive the request for assistance, coordinate the response, record the incident and dispatch resources.

During the 2003 interface fires, it was apparent that there were many emergency communications technology issues. For example:

• the capacity of some systems was exceeded;
• emergency phone systems were overwhelmed with calls; and,
• radio systems built for fire departments were not sufficiently expandable to manage all of the additional responders who arrived to assist.

As well, there were problems with compatibility of various systems, preventing complete communications between crews from various regions of the province and from outside the province.

Though many of these deficiencies were known prior to the 2003 fire season, it took an event like last summer’s firestorm to demonstrate the problem. The Review Team received a number of presentations that pointed out the non-compatibility of communications equipment and, in some cases, the absence of it. The comment was made that at times, this left the communication of fire, weather, and other vital information up to chance.

Specific problems encountered with communications equipment include the following:

• some of the responding fire departments use proprietary radio systems that currently do not function in more remote areas.
• some designated VHF emergency radio channels cannot be programmed into some of the newer radios.
• many fire departments have inter-operable radio systems but police, ambulance, forestry and air support may lack this compatibility.

The Review Team Recommends:

Achieve Emergency Radio Inter-Operability The British Columbia government should develop and implement a provincial strategy for emergency communications technology focused on moving over time to total inter-operability across agencies throughout the province.

Initial activities should include developing a provincial inventory for all fire, police, ambulance, forestry radios and frequencies to ensure that where radio systems are compatible, they can be programmed with common frequencies or talk groups.

Whenever portable and mobile radios for emergency services are replaced to accommodate narrow banding, they should be replaced with new radios that are inter-operable across agencies.

Amateur Radio

In the consultation process, the Review Team also heard about the important role that amateur radio operators played during Firestorm 2003. When emergency radio systems failed and cellular coverage was lost in some areas, the amateur radio operators were an invaluable, but at times overlooked resource.

During the wildfires, the amateur radio operators proved to be very resourceful, and demonstrated their commitment and dedication by relaying vital information over the airwaves.

However, some people did not consider them to be an integral part of the emergency response system. There appeared to be a lack of understanding and appreciation among some emergency agencies about the value of local amateur radio operators.

The Review Team noted that when the amateur radio groups were finally called upon, in some instances they were forced to improvise in order to support the communications effort. At times, the amateur operators were not assigned space in the Emergency Operations Centre.

The Review Team Recommends:

Include Amateur Radio Operators in Emergency Response

All Emergency Operation Centres should include a provision for amateur radio operators, including power and antenna space, in case they are needed.

Communications Systems should be regularly exercised to ensure that equipment, policies and procedures are functional.

All demographic indicators point to the continued increase of population in British Columbia's wildfire interface areas. Those who choose to live in close proximity to the forests must recognize that they are placing themselves at increased risk from the dangers of wildfire.

In particular, some presenters in the consultation process emphasized the need to educate city dwellers - such as cabin owners, campers and other seasonal residents and visitors - about the risks they face. Presenters also noted the need to inform and remind all citizens annually, prior to the fire season, about the wildfire risk in the Interior.

Perhaps most importantly, presenters stressed the need for regular information about basic responsibilities and escape routes during an evacuation.

Firefighters told the Review Team that the public has misconceptions about forest firefighting. For example, during Firestorm 2003 many people believed that human intervention could halt any fire and the failure to do so was because of human error. Whereas in reality, only Mother Nature could stop a rank five or six wildfire, as was experienced in several instances last summer.

There is a strong need to better inform and educate the general public, and interface residents in particular, about the dangers, risks and realities of forest fires. Public education is also needed to explain the preventative and protective measures that individuals who live in the interface can adopt to make their lives safer.

Much valuable information has been developed by many agencies for this very purpose. For example, some parts of the National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA) Risk Watch program is being successfully implemented in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Ontario.

The program's components include a guide on general preparedness for earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, wildfires and severe winter storms.

Another NFPA program circulating in the US, that could be adapted for British Columbia, is the Firewise process for interface homeowners.

Both of these NFPA public education programs would assist those living in interface areas to understand procedures they might undertake to better prepare themselves and their fellow residents for the ravages of a wildfire.

Closer to home, the Ministry of Forests provides a variety of educational materials about fireproofing interface subdivisions and dwellings in its Fire Smart program. Public meetings have been held and printed materials have been distributed in British Columbia over the last two decades on these topics.

Similarly, the Insurance Bureau of Canada has developed and distributed excellent educational material.

A review of material from many jurisdictions, nationally and internationally, suggests that most successful fire prevention and emergency planning programs place a major responsibility for reducing the risks of living in wildland/urban interface areas on the homeowner. Unfortunately, the past summer's destruction and losses would indicate that many British Columbian's are not aware of the things they must do to make living in interface communities safer.

Public education, combined with more appropriate building codes and well-developed subdivision plans, is essential.

The Review Team Recommends:

Educate the Public about Interface Wildfires

A cooperative public education program should be undertaken, building on material already available in various British Columbia government departments and agencies, as well as from external sources.

This education campaign must inform interface residents about the risks and their responsibilities in planning and preparing for and responding to interface fires.

The campaign should be delivered to school children as well as adults.

Municipal and regional governments should regularly distribute educational materials to interface residents. Insurance agents should distribute educational materials with each policy renewal of an interface dwelling.